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Abstract
This paper presents the duction framework for unifying the three basic forms of infer
ence - deduction, abduction, and induction - by specifying the possible relationships and
influences among them in the context of integrated learning. Special assumptive forms of
inference are defined that extend the use of these inference methods, and the properties
of these forms are explored. A comparison to a related inference-based learning frame
work is made. Finally several existing integrated learning programs are examined in the
perspective of the duction framework.
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1 Introduction
A number of integrated learning programs have been introduced recently, such as OC
CAM [Pazzani 86], GEMINI [Danyluk 87], UNIMEM [Lebowitz 86], lOU [Mooney 89] and
lOE [Flann 89]. These systems share the common idea that different inference-based learn
ing strategies can perform better when combined by using each one's strengths to support
the other's weaknesses. Until recently there was little work on classifying the different
learning strategies and determining how they might support one another, so that good
combinations of the methods could be proposed. This paper examines learning in the
perspective of the three main kinds of inference - deduction, abduction, and induction
- and the relationships among them, collectively referred to as duction. Several existing
integrated learning systems will then be classified according to the duction framework.
In this paper, we are more interested in learning as the acquisition of new knowledge
rather than learning as the improvement of performance. These two types of learning are
formalized in [Dietterich 86] as symbol level learning (SLL), which improves computational
performance without changing the knowledge level description of the system, and knowl
edge level learning (KLL), which increases the knowledge level description over time. While
the framework in the next .section can describe systems that perform SLL, the inference-
based learning strategies we will seek are those that perform KLL, mainly because we wish
to eventually develop a normative model of nondeductive knowledge level learning. One
possible way to develop such a model is to examine the constraints that can be placed
on an inductive learning component by other inference-based learning components. Some
such constraints are discussed in Section 2.3.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the three inference methods and
describes the relationships among them, and Section 3 extends these inferences to using
assumptions. Section 4 explains a related inference-based theory of learning, based on a dif
ferent set of inference methods. Section 5 explains the terms used to describe an integrated
learning system and then surveys twelve such systerris. Finally, Section 6 summarizes this
survey and presents some conclusions.
2 The three inference methods
The three kinds of implicative inference methods are deduction, abduction, and induction.
In terms of causal relationships, deduction yields an effect given its cause, while abduction
yields a suspected cause given its effect. Induction, the third form of inference, yields
a proposed relationship between the cause and the effect. Casting duction as scientific
discovery, induction is the process of theory formation from a set of data, and produces a
tentative set of laws describing the data. Deduction can be viewed as making predictions
based on this set of laws, allowing them to be tested. Abduction is the explanation of the
results by the theory, and may invoke theory revision if the results are not covered well by
the theory.
We shall see that all three forms of inference are necessary in a system that claims to be a
reasonable model of learning, because each method performs a distinct function in learning
and their relationships form a powerful set of learning strategies. Before examining these
interrelationships, the formal definitions of the three basic types of inference are presented,
followed by a comparison of their strengths and weaknesses.
2.1 Definitions
The following definitions of the three inference methods are in syllogistic terms, using
major and minor premises and a conclusion. The major premise is a rule, say P —>• Q,
while the minor premise is the antecedent P and the conclusion is the consequent Q of that
rule. Given these terms^ then
deduction Given a major premise (P Q) and a minor premise (P), the conclusion (Q)
may be deductively inferred.
abduction Given a major premise (P —>• Q) and a conclusion (Q), the minor premise (P)
may be abductively inferred.
induction Given a minor premise (P) and a conclusion (Q), the major premise (P —> Q)
may be inductively inferred.
The relationship among the definitions of the three inference methods can be represented
succinctly, as shown in Figure 1, where each method has its two requirements outlined and
its result left uncircled. We shall use the result to categorize each learning procedure in this
survey. This scheme classifies forward-chaining systems (such as some theorem provers)
and backward-chaining systems (such as EEL, see [MKK-C 86, DeJong 86]) as purely de
ductive learners. A purely inductive method, or SBL, would be used by any data-driven,
domain-independent systems, such as BACON [Langley 89] and ABACUS [Falk 86]. Very
few purely abductive^ systems exist; these include include AMAL [O'Rorke 89b] and
AbE [O'Rorke 89a].
Each method has its own set of uses in a learning program. Induction is well-known as
the provider of the domain theory, so it tends to serve as the basic learning component in
a system. Abduction's strength is the ability to provide a hypothesis, a new (and therefore
learned) piece of information that serves as an explanation for a set of events and can
^Throughout this paper, these terms may be used interchangeably: P for minor premise, P —»• Q for
major premise, and Q for conclusion. Also, P and Q will occasionally be called the cause and effect,
respectively.
^Possibly to be called HBL, or Hypothesis-Based Learning.
Deduction Abduction
Induction
Figure 1: Relationship among deduction, induction, and abduction.
be tested for its validity. Deduction appears in learning most often as explanation-based
learning, which finds an operational definition for a concept. Deduction is also used for
hypothesis verification by predicting what must follow from the hypothesis and testing
the truthfulness of those predictions . According to Dietterich's descriptions, then, EBL
performs symbol level learning, in which we are less interested than other types ofdeductive
learning.
2.2 Comparison of the inference methods
Before examining the relationships among the three inference methods, it might be best to
present them individually. A common statement made with respect to inference methods
is that deduction is the only valid method. Valid in this context means if the method is
given true statements, then its inferred statement is also true. For deduction, if the minor
premise and major premise are known to be true, then the conclusion must also be true.
So if
All men are mortal
is known to be a true statement, and
Socrates is a man
is also true, then
Socrates is mortal
must be true. Unfortunately, abduction and induction are not valid inference methods. If
all men are mortal and Socrates is mortal, abduction infers that Socrates is a man, which
may not be true. Socrates could be a woman, and all women happen to be mortal too.
Similarly, if Socrates is a man and Socrates is mortal, induction may infer that all men are
mortal, which again may not be true. There may be a few immortal men, and Socrates is
not one of them.
But more can be said about the three inference methods than just deduction is valid
and the others are not valid. Charles Peirce, who characterized scientific inquiry in terms of
the three inference methods (see [Fann 70]), called deduction explicative and abduction and
induction ampUative^. Explicative methods can infer what must follow from a given set of
knowledge, but only ampliative methods can add information beyond the deductive closure
to that set of knowledge. Dietterich would say that these ampliative methods perform
nondeductive knowledge level learning, which cannot be described at the knowledge level,
because they add knowledge in an unjustified (i.e., invalid) manner.
Peirce introduced a scale to describe the continuum along which the three inference
methods existed. This scale is shown in Figure 2. At one end of the scale is security, which
he defined as a measure of the method's approach to certainty. Deduction is completely
secure because its inferences are valid as long as its major and minor premises are true.
Induction is not secure because it can produce laws that are too general, but at the very
least each law holds for the data from which it was induced^. Abduction is the least
secure because it produces a hypothesis with no evidence, although some may be gathered
afterwards to support it.
high low
security security
deduction induction abduction
low high
uberty uberty
Figure 2: The security/uberty scale
^These terms correspond to analytic and synthetic, respectively, which are both used in the machine
learning literature.
"^Actually, the prognosis for induction is even more grim. Dietterich in [Dietterich 89] proves that any
purely inductive system can only learn a fraction of the possible concepts that can possibly cover the data,
and suggests studying the role of prior knowledge and its effect on the inductive process as a means of
improving induction's performance.
At the other end of the scale is uherty, which Peirce described as the method's value in
productiveness. Deduction does not produce any new knowledge and thus has a low degree
of uberty. Induction can discover new laws, but is unable to do anything with these laws.
They must be passed to deduction for testing, explanation, etc. Abduction can produce
new hypotheses, which represent new sources of knowledge and can be used by any of
the three inference methods - deduction can test the hypothesis, induction can relate it to
other knowledge, and further abduction can attempt to explain it.
The juxtaposition of security and uberty is useful for noticing the strengths and weak
nesses of the three inference methods. The most secure form of inference is deduction, but
it has the least uberty of the three methods. On the other hand, abduction has the grea.test
amount of uberty, but it is not very secure at all. Induction seems to be the best "middle
ground" approach, until one realizes that induction alone is neither very useful nor very
secure, because it does nothing with the domain theory it builds and cannot test it. The
best approach is a combination of all three methods, so that the usefulness of abduction is
backed by the security of deduction, and induction can benefit from and lend support to
them both. These relationships among inference methods are discussed in the next section.
2.3 Relationships among the inference methods: duction
We will use the term duction to refer collectively to all three inference methods and their
relationships. These relationships consist of one inference method trying to improve an
other's performance, through such actions as providing new hypotheses, directing attention
to a set of laws, or validating an inferential result. While each inference method is inter
esting in its own right, the truly powerful learning strategies grow out of the relationships
among the three methods. Some findings on these relationships are presented here, grouped
by the influencing method.
2.3.1 Inductive influences
Induction is the primary knowledge level learning mechanism in this framework. Any
rules not provided by a teacher or other outside source must originate from the induction
component. This component provides the domain theory to the abductive and deductive
components, so insuring the validity of these laws is extremely important. Although the
process of deduction is valid, it may still produce incorrect inferences if the induced rules
are not correct. Fortunately, both deduction and abduction can serve to help induction
produce valid rules.
Induction can also influence itself, by performing induction on the rules produced by
induction. This kind of self-directed influence, described in [Russell 86], allows an induc
tive component to build up a set of higher-level regularities that themselves instantiate
into laws. For example, after observing several Americans speaking English, a hypothet-
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ical system may induce that all Americans speak English. Similarly, after seeing several
Mexicans speaking Spanish, the system may induce that all Mexicans speak Spanish. Us
ing induction on the these two rules, the system may produce a higher-order rule, that
all people of a given nationality speak a common language. This regularity allows rules,
such as all Soviets speak Russian, to be created with just one instance. These new rules
will tend to be correct, because they are supported through the higher-level rule by the
instances that support the other similar rules.
2.3.2 Abductive influences
Abduction is mainly used to form explanations. These explanations relate an event to its
probable cause by using the rules such as those produced in an inductive phase or those
provided by a teacher. When the explanation is complete (i.e., all of the causes are known
to be true), then the explanation is also deductively secure, since deduction could build
the same explanation structure starting from the causes that abduction built starting with
the effects®.
Sometimes the explanation is iiicomplete, in the sense that some of its antecedents are
unprovable under the current set of laws. This problem can be addressed in several ways:
the antecedent can be assumed to be true (as in AbE [O'Rorke 89a]), the entire explanation
can be abandoned (as in standard EBL [DeJong 86]), or the inductive component can be
invoked, either to empirically determine the truth of the antecedent or to find a new law to
explain it. We find the latter method preferable, since it takes advantage of the integrated
framework and attempts to learn more about the antecedent in question. This directed
query to the inductive component also provides it with an attention mechanism (e.g., its
goal is to find what is associated with P, and not just to find any associations in the data).
Fawcett uses exactly this method in [Fawcett 89] to find rules for unproven antecedents.
Abduction can also direct induction in another way. After several explanations are
completed by the abductive component, it may call upon induction to find higher-level
relationships among the explanations, as suggested by [Russell 86]. This induction over
explanations is the basis of the lOE system [Flann 89], although lOE uses deduction, not
abduction, to form its explanations, that necessarily are complete.
Abduction can also direct the deductive component by providing it hypotheses to test.
The deductive component derives what must be true if the hypothesis was valid, and then
seeks the validity of these conclusions. For instance, the system may abduce that P is the
cause of some event, and this hypothesis is sent to the deductive component for testing.
Every conclusion that follows from P and the present set of knowledge could be explored,
and each conclusion that is found to be true adds to the certainty level of the hypothesis.
This support for the hypothesis represents deduction supporting abduction.
®This symmetryofabduction and deduction onsecure explanations maybe onereason tlie twoinferences
are so often confused. See also the discussion of abduction versus assumptive deduction in Section 3.
2.3.3 Deductive influences
Of course, deduction can do more than support abductive hypotheses. If any conclusion
is found to be contradicted by known facts, then the associated hypothesis is weakened or
abandoned altogether. Similarly, the deductive component can test the induced domain
theory, by looking at the conclusions the rules imply from known facts. If the facts are
certain, then any conclusion found to be true or false will support or weaken, respectively,
the rule(s) used to deduce it..
A standard use for deduction is the construction of complete, valid explanations. De
duction is also useful in verifying that a set of observations obey a rule that is "uninduce-
able" in the sense that a given inductive method would not find a rule that would explain
the data, but a rule existed nonetheless. While this framework was being developed, an
experiment was conducted to determine whether deduction and induction could improve
each other's performance (see [Cain 89]). A deductive component was added to BACON,
a purely inductive scientific discovery system, so that it could test its induced numerical
laws. One of the findings was that the improved BACON could deductively accept data
that the inductive component would reject as having no pattern. For example, the induc
tive component would reject the ideal gas data in Table 1 because there is no correlative
relationship between any two columns of data. But this data obeys the law
Pressure X Volume = 50.0 X Temperature
perfectly, and the deductive component can check this accordance quickly and efficiently.
Gas Volume Pressure Temperature
Ideal 1.0 100.0 2.0
Ideal 5.0 . 10.0 1.0
Ideal 10.0 40.0 8.0
Table 1: Ideal-gas data
Another useful finding from the experiment was that the deductive component could
determine useful variables upon which the inductive component should concentrate its
search. After a set of laws were found to be incorrect, the deductive component would
rearrange the data so that induction would initially search the space of laws that included
the variables in the failed laws. For instance, if the law PV = 50.0 failed, then a new
search would begin for laws that used the variables P and V. This rearrangement heuristic
is based on the idea that for a law to fail in the deductive phase, the inductive phase must
have earlier proposed some invalid law. Therefore, it is likely that, at the very least, some
of the variables in the failed laws will appear in the final laws. In practice this heuristic
reduced these failure-driven searches by an order of magnitude, in terms of number of
relationships explored.
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Finally, deduction can be used to "chunk" rules, as seen in a variety of systems and
mentioned in [DeJong 86] and in [O'Rorke 89a, O'Rorke 89b] (which refers to this as macro
construction). Chunking occurs when the proof tree for some set of conclusions is reduced
to only its leaves; all internal nodes are removed. For example, the long chain of deductions
P—^R, R—>S,S—>T, and T Q can be replaced with P —v Q. This last rule is referred
to as the operational definition for Q if P is a commonly or easily observed premise.
Operational definitions are preferable because they speed up the deductive system, allowing
it to conclude Q in one step rather than many.
3 Assumptive inference
A common misconception is that abduction is, in general, the method of making assump
tions. Actually, all of the inference methods can support making assumptions, and each
one has two assumptive forms, depending on which of the two required premises is as
sumed to be true. For example, if one has the major premise P —> Q and assumes the
minor premise P, then a form of assumptive deduction will infer the conclusion Q. Table 2
lists the six assumptive forms.
Form Given Assume Infer
Assumptive deduction P-.Q P Q
P P -> Q Q
Assumptive abduction P^Q Q p
Q P Q p
Assumptive induction P Q P Q
Q p P-Q
Table 2: The Six Assumptive Forms
A quick (and by no means exhaustive) review of popular learning systems shows that
the assumptive forms of deduction and abduction which require assuming a major premise
are not used. Since they effectively represent assuming a law so a fact can be used, their
absence seems justified. Similarly, assumptive induction (either form) is rarely seen, but
it occasionally is invoked to form laws using assumptions made by assumptive deduction
and assumptive abduction.
Of particular interest is a comparison between abduction and the useful form of as
sumptive deduction, the form that assumes the minor premise. Unfortunately, these two
methods are often confused because they share the surface similarities of starting from a
major premise P —>• Q and having a minor premise P of undetermined certainty. Abduc
tion takes the major premise and the conclusion Q and abduces P at an unknown level
of certainty. But assumptive deduction starts only with the major premise and assumes
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the minor premise is true, and then deduces the conclusion. Notice, though, that if P is
assumed at a level of certainty C, Q can be deduced at the same certainty level C, although
this certainty can be adjusted up or down through another (possibly empty) set of rules.
For example, let's say that a traffic light is controlled by either an internal timer, which
switches the light from red to green every several seconds, or a pedestrian crosswalk button,
which turns the traffic light red immediately. If a car is stopped at a red light, one can
abduce that the timer has made the traffic light red or a pedestrian has pressed the button,
but neither inference has a known level of certainty in the absence of further information.
But if one assumes that the timer makes the light red 50% of the time, then one can
assumptively deduce that the light will be red at least 50% of the time, because sometimes
a pedestrian will make the light red, too.
Thus, the two forms of inference propagate certainty levels very differently. Abduction
results in a premise P of unknown certainty from a conclusion Q of 100% certainty, while
assumptive deduction results in a conclusion Q of certainty equal to the assumed premise
P.
4 A related framework
The duction framework is not the only inference-based framework that has been proposed to
the machine learning community. In [Michalski 89], another theory of integrating learning
methods is proposed that uses a different basic set of three inference methods, in this
case induction, deduction, and analogy. In the duction framework, analogy would be
classified as a. form of induction. However, Michalski chooses to view abduction as a form
of induction. He derives a set of five learning strategies, which he believes can be used to
integrate empirical learning, constructive induction, learning by instruction, constructive
deduction, explanation-based learning, reinforcement learning, conceptual clustering, and
learning by analogy. Since any input builds up the domain theory, Michalski calls his
methodology multistrategy constructive learning.
4.1 MCL: multistrategy constructive learning
The basic idea behind these inference-based learning methods is that any input affects the
learner's background knowledge, or domain theory, through one of three inference methods
(deduction, induction, or analogy). Learning is only possible by performing inference and
by having a memory in which to store the results of inference. Memory also holds the
domain theory, if any, with which the learner begins. A particular learning strategy is
selected by a function of the input, the domain theory, and the learner's current goal.
Michalski discusses the importance of explanations in an advanced learner as opposed
to a beginning learning system, which simply learns by rote to build up its background
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knowledge. He divides an explanation into two parts: the explanatory hypothesis, which
is proposed as "entailing" the set of observations through the use of domain theory, and
the explanatory structure, which describes how the hypothesis and domain theory actu
ally entail the observations. He further divides explanations into deductive explanations,
which don't need the explanatory hypothesis because the domain theory is sufficient, and
inductive explanations, which require explanatory hypotheses. Both kinds of explanations,
he claims, are different from the generalizations produced by empirical inductive learning,
which simply summarize instances, because a true explanation involves abstractions and
causal relationships.
Michalski describes his five basic learning methods that may be used on input, depend
ing on the input and the learner's goals.
1. Empirical learning. This is the creation of an hypothesis on the basis of the given
input and domain-independent knowledge, using little or no background knowledge.
2. Constructive induction as generalization. This uses background knowledge to form
a generalization of the given input.
3. Constructive induction as abduction. This learning form creates an hypothesis to ac
count for the given input, by having the input deductively follow from the hypothesis
using the domain theory.
4. Constructive deduction. This is also called abstraction. This method uses the domain
theory to deduce a generalization of the input. It differs from generalization in that
abstractions are deductively valid and thus always true. For instance, "John lives in
California" deductively abstracts to "John lives in the United States" since California
is part of the United States (a background fact).
5. Explanation-based learning. This is the construction ofa deductive explanation using
only the input and the domain theory (no hypothesis).
Similarly, Michalski describes five situations that may result when input is received by the
system:
1. The input is completely novel. If no background knowledge can be generalized to
account for it, then the input is simply stored away.
2. The input contradicts the domain theory. The learner eitherspecializes its knowledge,
or simply stores the input, depending on the input's confidence level and the amount
of the domain theory that must be revised to account for it.
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3. The input is implied by the domain theory. The deductive explanation is constructed,
but what is done with this structure depends on the learning goal. For instance, the
explanation may be generalized and used as an operational definition of the concept
expressed by the input.
4. The input is similar to the domain theory. The system tries to match the input to its
background knowledge "at a higher level of abstraction" (i.e., analogically). If this
proves to be impossible, then the input is treated as novel (the first case).
5. The input is already known. That part of the background knowledge has its confi
dence level increased.
Michalski uses the classic "cup" domain as an example of how the different strategies
would learn various aspects of the concept of a cup, given different starting information and
goals. For example, given an example and some domain rules, his system could produce an
abstraction of the example using constructive deduction or an abstract concept description
using constructive induction as generalization. With the new abstract concept descrip
tion, the system could produce an operational concept description using explanation-based
learning. Unfortunately, the system has not yet been implemented.
4.2 MCL as duction
It is relatively straightforward to view MCL in the duction framework. Constructive de
duction and explanation-based learning are both deduction. Empirical learning and con
structive induction as generalization are both induction. Of course, constructive induction
as abduction is abduction. MCL seems overly complicated and has some other problems.
For example, constructive deduction and explanation-based learning appear to be the
same mechanism, except constructive deduction is not constrained since it has no target
concept. This makes EBL a special case of constructive deduction, but begs the question,
when does one stop abstracting with constructive deduction? Certainly not when the very
end of the deductive chain is reached, for that could be far too general (e.g., "John lives in
the universe."). Some reasonable stopping criteria can probably be found, but this is not
mentioned.
Conversely, constructive induction as generalization and abduction seem very different
mechanisms, which Michalski clumps together as one learning strategy. Michalski treats
generalization as a special case of abduction, since both are "inverses" of deduction. This
may mean they are both synthetic methods compared to analytic deduction, but they are
by no means similar in underlying mechanism. In fact, one could argue that deduction,
as EBL, is a special case of abduction in which the antecedents of the explanation are all
14
known to be true®. But the real issue is classifying the methods based on what they learn,
which for induction, deduction, and abduction are very different indeed.
On a final note, the paper seems somewhat contradictory at times. For example,
Michalski uses constructive induction as abduction to learn domain rules (see Figure 2,
page 19), but earlier (page 13) has this method using domain rules, not learning them.
Unfortunately, there is no system yet for exploring the many possibilities MCL seems to
offer. Overall, though, its concept as an inference-based theory of learning is similar to the
duction framework.
5 Survey of integrated learning systems
Several integrated learning systems have been produced in the past five years. This section
details a dozen of these systems^. Almost without exception, these systems combine de
ductive and inductive logic, integrating EEL and SBL in various ways. This survey focuses
on how the systems use the different inference methods to influence each other and improve
the overall performance of the system. Unfortunately, this improvement is not always seen,
and in some cases a degradation of performance can occur. This implies that integrated
learning is not always superior to single-method learning.
Before describing the systems, some definitions of domain theory assumptions are re
quired. These are assumptions that each learning system makes about the domain theory
given as input. As with any assumption, it may not be true, but the learner will act as if
the assumption applies to the given domain theory anyway.
Given two mutually exclusive concepts A and B®, a domain theory is described as
Complete - can explain all examples of concept A and all examples of concept B
Correct - never explains an example of concept B as an example of concept A, and vice
versa
Consistent - only explains examples of concept A as examples of concept A, and examples
of concept B as examples of concept B
Incomplete - cannot explain all examples of concept A or all examples of concept B (this
is an overspecific domain theory)
®Fawcett mentions this special case occurring in his system PLAUSEX [Fawcett 89].
^The perceptive reader will note that connectionist systems are avoided in the survey. The author felt
their addition would considerably lengthen this survey and require even more use of jargon than without
them. No slight towards these fine systems is intended.
®We do not say A and not(A) because many systems have difficulty with negation, especially as the
head of a rule. Also, requiring that B be the negation of A is too specific, when all that is required here
is mutual exclusion.
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Incorrect - explains some examples of concept B as examples of concept A, or vice versa
(this is an overgeneral domain theory)
Inconsistent - can explain an example of concept A as an example of concepts A and B,
or explain an example of concept B as an example of concepts A and B
Single - can only produce one explanation for an example
Multiple - can produce several different explanations for an example. Different expla
nations here can mean different complete explanations, or partial explanations with
different structures.
These assumptions are not all mutually exclusive, so it is possible for a system to assume
that its domain theory is both incorrect and incomplete^. Instead they are pairwise mu
tually exclusive and exhaustive, meaning a theory is either complete or incomplete^", but
not both. From the definitions of the assumptions, it is relatively easy to show that correct
theories are always consistent, but incorrect theories are not necessarily inconsistent. Note
that the multiple explanation assumption does not presuppose that these explanations are
inconsistent, but all inconsistent domain theories must support multiple explanations.
A Venn diagram of these relationships is shown in Figure 3, where the space of all
possible domain assumptions is divided among incomplete, incorrect, and inconsistent
theories. The space outside each of these imperfect theories represents the space of its
opposite assumption, so the space outside of the incomplete space is the area of complete
theories. The single and multiple explanation assumptions are not shown, since any domain
theory can support either assumption, with the exception of inconsistent domains (as noted
above).
Some of the systems act as if their assumptions are correct without, checking them
first. For example, the lOU system [Mooney 89] assumes that the supplied domain theory
is incorrect, in that explanations that are built with the theory may apply to negative
examples of a concept as well as positive ones. So even if the given theory is correct, lOU
will try to "fix" it anyway.
Rajamoney and DeJong classify imperfect domain theories (corresponding to incom
plete, incorrect or inconsistent theories, as defined here) in [Rajamoney 87] as incomplete
or inconsistent, each with two types. While their system and the system presented here can
be mapped onto each other and are not contradictory, this mapping is not one-to-one in
either direction. Our system is preferred due to its direct mapping to the semantically sim
ple meanings.of overgeneral and overspecific. Also, Rajamoney and DeJong assume that
multiple explanations are expected to be inconsistent, an assumption that is not forced
under our framework.
®An incorrect and incomplete theory is often called imperfect.
^"With respect to one concept, that is.
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Domain assumptions
incomplete
inconsistent
Figure 3: The relationships among imperfect domain theories
Most of the following twelve systems address the incomplete theory problem (see Ta
ble 3), although five systems attempt to solve the incorrect theory problem (and two of
those try to solve both). The majority of the systems can only employ single-explanation
domain theories. Only three systems can work with multiple-explanation theories. Three
of the systems, ML-SMART, UNIMEM, and SaranWrap, appear to tolerate inconsistent
as well as incorrect domain theories.
The terms tight integration, supervised, and incremental appear in Table 3. Tight inte
gration means that the system can perform either of its inference-based learning strategies
at any time. Compare this to a modular arrangement, in which one component completely
finishes its learning and passes its results to another component, which then performs its
learning strategy. The second term, supervision, means that the learning system is supplied
with an oracle of some kind. Typical oracles are those that give the correct classification
of a given instance or those that confirm or deny a system's generalizations. Finally, in
cremental systems are those that perform some learning with the input of each instance
and never reprocess those instances. Nonincremental systems need to be given a set of
instances all at once, and reprocess those instances whenever more input is received.
The following survey is organized by the domain assumptions of the systems. For the
systems that assume single-explanation theories, six systems assume that the theory is
incomplete, two assume incorrectness, and one assumes incorrectness and inconsistency.
For the systems that assume multiple-explanation theories, one assumes the theory is
incomplete and two can work with any kind of imperfect theory. The survey is followed by
a summary of these integrated systems.
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Supervised/
Main author System Combines Incremental Domain assumptions
Blum RX I-D UnSuper/Nonincrem Incom, Sing
Danyluk GEMINI D-I . Unsuper/Increm Incom, Sing
Drastal MIRO D-I Super/Nonincrem Incom, Sing
Muggleton CIGOL A-If Super/Increm Incom, Sing
Pazzani OCCAM D-I Unsuper/Increm Incom, Sing
Widmer — D-If Super/Increm Incom, Sing
Flann ICE D-I Super/Nonincrem Incor, Sing
Mooney lOU D-I Super/Nonincrem Incor, Sing
Lebowitz UNIMEM I-D Unsuper/Nonincrem Incor, Incon, Sing
Fawcett PLAUSEX A-I Super/Increm Incom, Mult
Bergadano ML-SMART D-It Super/Nonincrem Incom, Incor, Incon, Mult
Pazzani SaranWrap D-If Super / Nonincrem Incom, Incor, Incon, Mult
that combine deduction and induction prefer the former over the latter.
Table 3: System summary
5.1 Single-explanation learners
These systems (RX, GEMINI, MIRO, CIGOL, OCCAM, Widmer's system, IDE, lOU,
and UNIMEM) assume that the domain theory supports only one explanation for a given
example. The first six systems (RX through Widmer's system) work on incomplete domain
theories, but each uses a different set of learning strategies or a different integration scheme
of supervision, incrementality, and modularity. The next two systems, IDE and lOU, work
with incorrect domain theories. Both use EBL to build explanations for a given set of input,
but ICE then runs SBL over the explanations, while lOU runs SBL over the features that
do not get used in explanations. Finally, UNIMEM can work with inconsistent domain
theories as well as incorrect ones.. Although inconsistent domain theories necessarily can be
used to explain an example in multiple ways, UNIMEM is supplied with a set of instances
and uses this set to indicate which of the conflicting rules to use.
5.1.1 RX
Overview
In [Blum 86, Blum 82], Blumdescribes the RXsystem, a set ofprograms for discovering
and confirming rfiedical hypotheses with the use a large database. The system follows a
model of clinical research that involves four modules:
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a discovery •process that finds relationships among medical variables (this is the in
ductive component)
• a study module that designs studies for each hypothesis formed by the discovery
module
• a statistical a'nalysis package that applies the model formed by the study module to
the data (this is the deductive component)
• a knowledge base that holds medical knowledge and patient records, and to which
newly confirmed hypotheses are added (this is the domain theory)
All of the modules, with the exception of the statistical package, are described in the
papers. The statistical package is the separate system IDL, the Interactive Data-analysis
Language.
The discovery module looks for relationships among primary and derivable attributes
of a patient's record, examiningthe attributes in pairs, searching for correlations (an O(n^)
process). Any number of patients in the database can be examined by the discovery module,
with the remaining patients serving as a testbed for the hypotheses. For the experimental
trials in the paper, ten patients were used by the discovery module.
The study module is the largest of the four parts of RX. It accepts a hypothesis from
the discovery module (or directly from a human researcher) and generates a model of the
hypothesis that is plausible to test based on the medical and statistical knowledge in the
database. The study module tries to show that the hypothesis is not spurious (i.e. the effect
has some other cause besides the one being postulated). Production rules act as heuristic
guides for the study module in doing such tasks as controlling confounding variables. The
model is then passed to the statistical analysis package, which confirms or disconfirms the
hypothesis using a larger set of patient records in the database.
The knowledge base used data from ARAMIS, the American Rheumatism Association
Medical Information System. This database is hierarchical, where each node represents a
schema containing property-value pairs of medical and statistical information.
Critique
This system is interesting in that it does not come from the machine learning community
and its integration of learning methods predates any other system described here by at least
four years. In addition, RX has a real, complex domain theory, and its study module for
designing experiments to test hypotheses has no equivalent in any other known integrated
learning system^^. RX has been tested using data on real problems and has been fairly
successful.
^^However, see [Kulkarni 88, Falk 88] for examples of machine discovery systems with the capability to
propose and interpret experiments.
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However, RX has its limitations. Its use of pairwise causation limits the system so
that it cannot discover multiply-caused diseases (e.g., where A A B ^ C). RX can use
incomplete domain theories, but noise does not appear to be tolerated, which is odd for
a real domain. For example, the pneumonia case (page 171 of [Blum 82]) requires the
patient's temperature to be over 38 degrees Celsius. If the temperature is 37 degrees, this
exacting rule seems to imply the pneumonia is ruled out. Perhaps there is a parameter that
determines how closetwo values can be to be considered equal (cf. BACON in [Langley 89]).
Evidence for several hidden parameters appears in the paper. For example, the causality
rules on page 172 mention repeated observations where A generally precedes B and the
intensity of A is correlated with the intensity of B. No mention is made of how many
observations are necessary, how often A must precede B, or how closely A and B must
correlate to trigger the causality rules. These hidden parameters may be finely tuned for
RX's particular domain.
Since Blum was concerned with knowledge acquisition, RX never uses its knowledge to
form hypotheses in unknown cases, an abductive process. The addition of an abductive
diagnostic module to RX would be an interesting project.
5.1.2 GEMINI
Overview
Danyluk's GEMINI [Danyluk 87] system combines EBL and SBL together to generalize
an incomplete domain theory. A subsystem of GEMINI, a learner/analyzer module, is
described that can generalizeand explain an event by using a rule base, a concept hierarchy,
and an incident hierarchy (of previously generalized events). EBL and SBL are combined
in the sense that, while each is used in a distinct phase, each provides the other with
information that directs its learning during its phase.
First, the EBL component builds an explanation of a new event, using the rule base
as its domain theory. This explanation is not generalized but is instead passed to the
SBL component. This component compares the features of this explanation to those of
other similar events in the incident hierarchy, producing a generalized explanation of the
events. A concept hierarchy is provided so that the SBL component can make inexact
matches. For example, if one event occurred in a bookseller's store and another occurred
in a grocery, then the SBL component would generalize the event location to store. The
SBL component also uses contextual information when generalizing, so the times of the
two events above may be generalized to business hours rather than daytime, because
the location is a public place. Contextual clues are based only on those features that were
in the explanations, since they are guaranteed to be important.
Thus, the EBL component provides the SBL component with an explanation, which can
be viewed as a group of relevant features and their context. Danyluk claims that the SBL
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component, in turn, can provide the EBL component with causality clues to help it select
rules to explain complex events. This SBL influence is not yet implemented and therefore is
briefly described, but Danyluk relates the process to UNIMEM's extraction of predictability
information from a set of data (cf.). Finally, since the SBL component is performing the
generalization of an explanation, it controls the range of possible generalizations of an
event that can be made by the system.
Critique
There are some problems with this integration of EBL and SBL. Explanations are
generalized by the SBL component and, unless the matches are exact, this generalization
is constrained by the concept hierarchy. For example, bookseller and grocery must
appear in the hierarchy under store, or GEMINI will not find any similarity between
the two locations. This implies that the concept hierarchy must be complete, but solving
such a complete domain theory problem is what GEMINI is supposed to do. Danyluk has
replaced a complete domain theory with an incomplete rule base and a complete concept
hierarchy.
Another problem is that the SBL phase only looks at features mentioned in the expla
nation. With the incomplete domain theory, the EBL could fail to produce an explanation.
The SBL phase would then have nothing to generalize. Perhaps the SBL component should
only give more attention to the features that appear in the explanation but still use unex
plained features, similar to lOU. Then two unexplained events could be compared for the
features they share, and these common features could be made into a (possibly overspeciflc)
rule to be later generalized by GEMINI.
5.1.3 MIRO
Overview
Drastal and Czako [Drastal 89] describe MIRO, a system that combines deduction
and induction for concept formation. Basically, the system uses deduction to form an
abstraction space, and then performs induction in this space, rather than the original
space.
More speciflcally, deduction finds the abstraction space A by constructing the set L^,
the abstract concept description language. A bottom-up deductive procedure is used on
an and/or graph induced from the domain theory; the procedure finds a set of pairs (x, a)
where a; is a descriptor and a is a pointer to a proof that establishes x as true or false.
There is one pair for each positive and negative training example. The entire set makes up
La.
Induction proceeds through candidate elimination. A positive instance, called the seed,
is selected from the training set, and a set G of partial concept descriptions is formed
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that excludes all negative examples and includes a subset (not necessarily proper) of the
positive examples. The subset is guaranteed to include the seed. The elernents of G
are then specialized by adding descriptors from the abstract language All positive
instances covered by this set are removed from the list of positive training examples, a new
seed is selected, and the process continues. ,
i
Critique '
i
The authors present convincing evidence that induction in the abstraction space needs
fewer examples than the same inductive method in the original space. However, yhile they
state that the method is able to extend an incomplete domain theory, they do not say what
happens when no proof is available for a particular descriptor Xj. This event could occur
when the value of xj is unknown or the domain theory is too specific to explain ixj's value.
Drastal and Czako also assume there is only one way to explain the value of aj descriptor
during the deductive phase (this is the single explanation assumption). There may be more
than one abstraction space, defined as several ways of proving the value of descriptor x.
If so, one of these spaces could be better than another for performing induction. More
exploration of this idea could have interesting results, such as how to find the [best space
without doing induction in all of them. !
I
5.1.4 CIGOL !
i
Overview !
Muggleton and Buntine [Muggleton 88] describe CIGOL, an inductive/abduetive learn
ing program that can generate and generalize new predicates and thus define its own vo
cabulary for concept descriptions. The basis of CIGOL is a method of inverting resolution,
a deductive process, leading to its opposite inference, which is induction if a rule is inferred
and abduction if a predicate is inferred. All generalizations of predicates are confirmed by
a teacher before CIGOL accepts them. ;
CIGOL uses three operators to perform inverse resolution: "V" operators take the
clause at their base and one of their arm clauses, and produce the other arm clause; they
are called absorption or identification operators depending on whether the literal resolved
on is positive or negative in the supplied arm clause. "W" operators find a clause A such
that A resolves on a common literal L with two other clauses Ci and C2 to form Bi and
B2. Since L is resolved away and does not appear in Bi or B2, "W" operators introduce
new predicates, and the operators are called intra-construction if this new predicate is
negative and inter-construction if this new predicate ,is positive. The third operator type
is truncation, which handles the case when the base clause(s) of "V" and "W" operators
are empty, which occurs at the root of every refutation tree.
Some examples of concepts that CIGOL has learned are list-reverse, listTminimum,
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ordered-binary-tree-insert, and merge-sort. While learning some of these concepts, CIGOL
invented predicates such as "append" and "less-than" (the names were supplied by the
user). CIGOL is the only system here that can invent new predicates to add to its repre
sentation language.
Critique
Presently, CIGOL only uses absorption, intra-construction, and truncation. Since both
of the remaining operators, inter-construction and identification, construct positive terms,
this implies some sort of difficulty with performing inverse resolution involving a negative
term as the basis. No explanation for the lack of implementation of these operators is
given, though.
Several assumptions are made in the paper. The first, the assumption of separability,
assumes that there are no common literals in the two arm clauses after substitution, except
for the literals resolved on. The second assumption is that the arm clause used by a V
operator, absorption or identification, is a unit clause. These assumptions would appear
to limit the space of possible generalizations made by CIGOL, but again, no explanation
is given in the paper.
An interesting task would be to remove the user from CIGOL's loop. Examples would
come from the environment, predicate generalizations would be tested directly by CIGOL
rather than asking the user (although CIGOL would need to handle probabilities, since
nothing short ofexhaustive testing can confirm a theory), and names of sub-concepts would
be arbitrary. A partial test, which ran CIGOL in an automatic mode where all questions
to the user were assumed to be answered in the affirmative, is described in [Muggleton 89].
Unfortunately, this test did not involve the generation of any new predicates by CIGOL.
5.1.5 OCCAM
Overview
Pazzani, Dyer, and Flowers [Pazzani 86] present OCCAM, an oft-cited "classic" of in
tegrated learning. OCCAM combines EBL and SBL to generalize events and extend its
incomplete domain theory. OCCAM's basic algorithm takes each new event and explains
why it is similar to other events that share its most specific generalization. Similar to
Gemini's concept hierarchy assisting its SBL component, OCCAM maintains a theory of
causal relationships to help its EBL component establish explanations for the similarities
among the events. If prior causal theories confirm this explanation, a new explanatory
generalization is created. If they deny the explanation, it is discarded. If the prior causal
theories neither confirm nor deny the explanation, then it is marked as a tentative gener
alization. If a future event contradicts the tentative generalization, it will be discarded.
Otherwise, a variety of strategies can be employed to confirm the tentative generalization,
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including increasing confidence as it successfully predicts new events until some confirma
tory threshold is reached.
This description is ah overview of basic OCCAM. Several extensions have been made
to the system since its vdescription in [Pazzani 86]. Two extensions in [Pazzani 88] allow
OCCAM to work more effectively with incomplete domain theories and to work with incor
rect domain theories. The first extension allows OCCAM to induce a missing explanatory
link after seeing several examples by using an abstract explanation formed from a causal
pattern. For example, after seeing examples of economic sanction, OCCAM can use an
abstract explanation that a state of an object enables an action upon it and induce that
suppliers can sell their goods for a greater price if the demand increases. The second exten
sion allows OCCAM to detect incorrect schemas by their incorrect predictions and correct
them by rederiving the schema with a revised domain theory. For example, OCCAM may
have a rule that tall people try to preserve the health of others. While a foundational
example may correct this rule, a coercion schema based on the old rule may still exist and
may fail to explain a coercion example. OCCAM determines that the schema incorporates
a rule that is no longer supported and uses EBL to derive a new coercion schema.
In [Pazzani 89b], OCCAM is further extended to detect those rules that are preventing
an example from being explained. OCCAM can then generalize these overspecific rules,
correcting its incomplete domain theory. For example, if OCCAM had an overly specific
rule that required two interacting countries to have free economies, a coercion schema using
that rule may fail to explain a coercion example involving a country with a controlled
economy. OCCAM can detect this rule by finding that it causes the difference between
the example's features and the schema's features. The rule is then corrected so that it
accounts for the example.
Critique
As with Fawcett's system (cf. PLAUSEX), it is possible for a set of events to cause
an incorrect tentative generalization to be confirmed and enter basic OCCAM's domain
theory as an explanatory generalization.
For example, OCCAM can work in a domain of inflating balloons where the theory is
empty. After given a positive and negative example, a tentative generalization is produced
that balloons need to be red if they are to be inflated. In their paper, this generalization is
refuted by a later contradictory event of a green balloon being inflated. But if the tentative
generalization is coincidentally supported by later events, it will be confirmed and become
an explanatory generalization. This new rule,
inflatable(X) isa(X,balloon), color(X,red).
results in a domain theory that is both overspecific, since not a,ll inflatable balloons can
be explained by it, and overgeneral, since not all red' balloons can be inflated. Since
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OCCAM cannot perform the specialization needed to correct an overgeneral theory, using
the incorrect generalization will degrade the system's performance.
It has not yet been determined the variety of different incomplete and/or incorrect
domain theories that can be handled by the extensions to OCCAM. For example, the above
rule may not be detected as overspecific if it and another overspecific rule both contributed
to an imperfect schema. The blame assignment in [Pazzani 89b] can only correct schemas
that are "close" to explaining the example, where close means that only one inference rule
causes all of the differences between schema and example. Further research into advanced
blame assignment algorithms would improve the scope and performance of OCCAM (and
many other systems) tremendously.
5.1.6 Widmer's system
Overview
Widmer presents a system in [Widmer 89] that combines SBL and EBL in a more
finely-meshed integration than the other systems surveyed here, except for ML-SMART
and SaranWrap. While the majority of the other systems have distinct phases in which
SBL or EBL is taking place, Widmer's system can be viewed as always performing EBL
and calling upon SBL to support non-deductive links in the explanation. In effect, it is
performing EBL with weaker links.
Widmer identifies three types of links explaining a feature F in the explanation tree.
The first is the standard deductive link connecting F with a set of conditions Cond from
a rule F : - Cond. The second is determination-based analogy, where F is explained by
reference to another situation having the same combination of features, including F. The
third type of link explains F by finding a similarity between the present situation and
another situation that includes F; either certain features of the situation indicate that it
belongs to a certain class, or a particular rule almost fits the current situation and can
be generalized to fit. The latter leads to incremental generalization, while the former is
inductive generalization.
Critique
Widmer has produced a good system, one of the five surveyed incremental integrated
learning systems^^. In addressing the incomplete theory problem, this system risks over-
generalizing the domain, but supervision by a human teacher prevents this from occurring.
Unfortunately, this system suffers from the same problem as GEMINI in that it needs a
separate set of information to guide its SBL component. In this case, a sei uf determinations
^^GEMINI, PLAUSEX, CIGOL, and OCCAM are the other incremental systems.
25
are required instead of a concept hierarchy^^. Presumably, these determinations are correct,
as Widmer makes no provisions for correcting them. Since determinations can lead to
incorrect generalizations, the presence of the teacher here is required if the system is to be
prevented from overgeneralizing the domain theory. Removing this oracle from the system
would be an interesting extension to this work.
5.1.7 lOE
Overview
Flann and Dietterich introduce lOE, or Induction Over Explanations, in [Flann 89].
JOE is used to specialize an incorrect theory by taking an example of a concept TC and
performing EBL, but the resulting explanation is taken as the necessary and sufficient
conditions for another concept C. Thus C is a specialization of TC. EBL is not used to
operationalize TC, but to correctly define C.
The algorithm is clearer when compared to EBG [MKK-C, 86, DeJong 86] and mEBG,
or multiple-example EBG. EBG constructs an explanation for why an example is an in
stance of a target concept and then generalizes this explanation. mEBG constructs an
explanation for each one of several examples, finds the largest common subtree among
these explanations, and then generalizes this subtree. ICE also generalizes the largest
common subtree produced by an mEBG component, but it also finds constraints on the
variables in this generalized subtree, in effect finding special cases of the concept definition
learned by mEBG. While EBG may learn about one type of cup and mEBG may learn
about the features common to all cups, TOE can also learn about all-plastic cups, cups
with metal sides, and many other specialized cups.
Critique
Flann and Dietterich state that lOE's space of specializations is larger than EBG's
and mEBG's. In fact, lOE's space encompasses the other two's spaces, because lOE uses
mEBG's result as the basis for its specializations. Therefore, JOE can produce any result
from mEBG, and both in turn can produce any result from EBG. ,
The authors point out that since lOE is capable of more specialization, its domain
theory can be more general than the other methods' domain theories. A more general
theory, they argue, is easier to construct, and they demonstrate that lOE can work equally
well in a chess domain made by Flann or one made by someone else with no knowledge of
lOE. However, they admit that lOE requires more examples than EBG and mEBG, but
they show that the amount is not excessive and can be quite small in domains with many
concept hierarchy implies that Widmer's SBL component must make exact matches, another
limitation (but one shared by most integrated systems).
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uniformly-distributed values for each feature.
The authors neglected to mention that lOE assumes all relevant features are in the
mEBG component's explanation subtree^^. Since the domain theory is assumed to be
incorrect, some negative examples may be explained by this subtree, and the distinguishing
feature of these negative examples may be an unused feature. Eor example, suppose the
target concept TG is defined as
object(X) ball(X).
and the desired specialized concept C is
object(X) ball(X), red(X).
Some positive examples of C are given as
ball(objl), red(objl).
ball(obj2), red(obj2).
ball(obj3), red(obj3).
lOE would explain this collection as all being balls (so C equals TC in this trivial case)
which is an overgeneralization of C. The unused feature red must be included to correct
the definition of C. However, since it does not appear in TC, lOE will not add it.
5.1.8 lOU
Overview
Mooney and Ourston [Mooney 89] describe a system combining EBL and SBL to spe
cialize an incorrect theory. The idea behind lOU (Induction Over the Unexplained) is
straightforward - use SBL to remove negative examples that are explained as positive by
the overgeneral domain theory. The algorithm is also straightforward. After disjunctively
combining the explanations (from the EBL component) for the positive examples, any neg
ative example not explained by this combination is discarded, as its already distinguished
as being negative. The positive and remaining negative examples are passed to the SBL
component, which tries to correctly classify them using the features^® that do not appear
in the explanations. Those features that distinguish positive from negative examples are
conjunctively added to the explanations formed by the EBL component, thus specializing
the theory.
^^Notice that lOU makes the opposite assumption. It looks for additional features among the unused
features instead. GEMINI makes the same assumption as lOE, but GEMINI tries to fix an incomplete
theory, not an incorrect one.
^®Features in lOU are propositional only. No predicates are used.
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Critique
Although their MLW89 paper is not clear, the EBL component appears to send the
SBL component a list of features such that each feature is missing from every explanation.
The alternative is to send SBL a list of features such that each feature is missing from any
one of the explanations, but this alternative will probably send most or all of the features
to SBL.
So assume the first case - features missing from every explanation go on to' SBL. This
prunes a lot of features, Tut examples can be generated that lOU cannot handle. Say a
target concept is ,
object red ball or blue cube
and the overly general domain theory defines object as
object ball or cube
Examples are classified as positive (+) or negative (-) by a teacher:
+: red ball
+: blue cube
-: red cube
blue meanie
lOU's EBL component classifies the first three as objects. The color features are missing
from every explanation, so they are passed to SBL:
red
blue
red
No color pattern distinguishes positive examples from negative ones, and lOU fails. In fact,
lOU will fail in any situation where the nonexplanatory features that distinguish positive
from negative examples are not true for every positive example.
5.1.9 UNIMEM
Overview
UNIMEM [Lebowitz 86] is oneof the original integrated learning systems (cf. OCCAM).
Whereas many of the systems described here perform EBL followed by SBL, Lebowitz
chooses to first perform SBL, and then run EBL over the generalizations that SBL produced
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rather than over the original instances. This method avoids running EBL on atypical cases,
as the SBL component will not incorporate them.
UNIMEM first runs its SBL component over the data, extracting predictability infor
mation from it. This information takes the form of predictive features, which are likely to
be causes in the explanation to be produced. The SBL component can find these predictive
features using correlative measures. For example, if A always appears in generalizations
with B, but B appears in some generalizations without A, then B cannot cause A because
then A would appear wherever B appears. But A may be a cause of B, making A a predic
tive feature. Thus, the SBL component not only makes a generalization to describe some
data, but it indicates which of the features in the generalization may be causes and which
are effects.
The EBL component can use this set of predictive features, along with a heuristic set
of domain rules, in a causal explanation (e.g., using A as an "explanation" for B). Since
the EBL component is guided by the SBL component, the domain theory it uses does not
need to be perfect, and in fact can be incorrect and inconsistent. Each predictive feature
may or may not explain nonpredictive features in the generalization, through the use of the
domain theory. If any predictive feature is not used as a cause, then UNIMEM will check
to see if it is explainable with the other predictive features. In this manner, coincidental
correlations in the data are corrected.
Critique
Lebowitz admits that this SBL/EBL method has some problems, most noticeably with
conjunctions of predictive features. Forexample, if three features together predict a fourth,
but none alone predict the fourth, then the SBL component can not find this predictive
conjunction. Since the three features can occur individually without the fourth, they will
not be seen as causes of that feature.*This reduces the scope of applicability of UNIMEM
treinendously, since such important domains as medical diagnosis rely on multi-causal
explanations.
Lastly, UNIMEM unfortunately does not correct the domain theories it uses. Its SBL
component can guide the EBL component away from the incorrect and inconsistent rules
by focusing it on the predictive features, but those rules exist nonetheless. In a domain
with noisy data, the SBL component could direct the EBL component to use an incorrect
rule, leading to poor generalizations.
5.2 Multiple-explanation learners
These systems do not assume that the domain theory supports only one explanation.
The first system, PLAUSEX, assumes that the domain theory is incomplete and tries to
generalize it by adding rules formed from the explanations. It is capable of numerically
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ranking the different explanations and selecting the best one for rule formation. The last
two systems, ML-SMART and SaranWrap, use tight integrations of EBL and SBL and can
work with any kind of imperfect doinain theory.
5.2.1 PLAUSEX
Overview
Fawcett's system [Fawcett 89], called PLAUSFX, is one of the two systems described
here that uses abduction. The author describes an incremental method of learning, com
bining abduction and induction and using incomplete domain theories^®. The algorithm
consists of generating all possible partial explanations (i.e., explanations with unproven
antecedents) for an example, and then ranking them using relative and absolute measures.
The highest-ranked partial explanation is then used to inductively learn a new rule for
each unproven antecedent. The left-hand side of the rule is the unproven antecedent, and
the right-hand side are all of the unused features in the example, that is those features not
used in the explanation. After several new rules have been added to the rule base, induc
tive generalization can be used to remove irrelevant features from the rules by removing
right-hand terms that do not appear in all of the rules. PLAUSFX does not yet perform
this last inductive step.
Of particular interest is the relative and absolute measures Fawcett uses to rank the
partial explanations. Two absolute measures are given: don't accept an explanation that
cannot prove particular "special" antecedents (like is_a) and don't accept an explanation
that leaves unproven an antecedent that another explanation can prove. For example, if a
complete explanation has been found for the antecedent is_stable, then PLAUSFX will
reject any explanation that contains a partial explanation of is_stable.
The four relative measures are to prefer explanation X over explanation Y if: X uses
fewer rules than Y, X uses more example features than Y, X contains fewer unproven
antecedents than Y, and X uses more specific rules than Y. The first three measures are
bound up in a numerical evaluation function f(x) (where x is each antecedent) that can
rank partial explanations.
Critique
Fawcett states that a large amount of pruning is performed by the second absolute
measure, that of rejecting partial explanations that leave an antecedent unproved when
a complete explanation for it has been found elsewhere. This may cause a problem if
^®PLAUSEX can actually use more of the incomplete domain space than other systems, since it can use
domain rules that only partially explain a positive example, while other systems that use deduction need
to build a full explanation to be able to take advantage of those rules.
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PLAUSEX is working on a simple binary explanation tree and can ground the left subtree
or the right subtree but not both. A system like AbE would produce 2 partial explanations,
with the first having the left subtree grounded and the right unexplained, and the second
having the right subtree grounded and the left one unexplained. PLAUSEX would produce
nothing, which may or may not be acceptable. Of course, this example can be generalized
to n partial explanations with n subtrees, and even worse pathological examples can be
created. The point is that this heuristic may prevent PLAUSEX from exploring parts of
the explanation space that contain desirable partial explanations.
The problems for PLAUSEX grow worse still. Fawcett claims that his work addresses
the incomplete theory problem identified in [MKK-C 86]. He states that it is not assumed
that every observable feature is provided to the system. From these statements, it can
be shown that his system may solve the incomplete theory problem by transforming the
domain theory into an incorrect theory instead. Thus, Fawcett will also need to address
this problem.
Incorrectness is introduced into the domain theory in the following manner. Suppose
a domain theory for cups is incomplete and does not possess a definition for stable(X).
Suppose the true definition is
stable(X) part_of(X,B), is-a(B,bottom), flat(B).
but the system is never given flat(B) as an observed feature (which is one of Fawcett's
assumptions, that every observable feature is not provided). After several explanations
involving stable(X), the system may have induced several rules such as
stable(X)
stable(X)
stable(X)
- part_of(X,B), is-a(B,bottom), color(B,white).
- part_of(X,B), is-a(B,bottom), color(B,red).
- part_of(X,B), is-a(B,bottom), material(X,ceramic).
that may be generalized into
stable(X) part_of(X,B), is-a(B.bottom).
Although this rule will correctly identify actual stable cups, it is too general and will rec
ognize many unstable cups. This rule makes the domain theory incorrect, and PLAUSEX
is designed to complete the domain theory, not correct it.
5.2.2 ML-SMART
Overview
This system tightly integrates SBL and EBL. Rather than perform the inductive and
deductive steps in distinct phases, ML-SMART performs EBL and calls upon SBL to help
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it with imperfections in its domain theory. ML-SMART can thus handle theories that are
incomplete, incorrect, and inconsistent.
Unlike standard EBL algorithms that need only one positive example, ML-SMART
requires a training set of positive and negative examples. The system runs until it has
gathered a group of explanations that explain all of the positive examples but none of the
negative ones. In this fashion, ML-SMART is capable of working with domain theories that
can explain an example in multiple ways. In a sense, the system only does specialization,
but gathers enough different explanations to cover all of the positive examples.
The learning algorithm works as a form of best-first search that tries to find the .smallest
set of explanations that cover the positive examples. Starting with the nonoperational
predicate to be learned, at each step ML-SMART replaces a nonoperational predicate
with its antecedents from the domain theory. If more than one rule exists, then all sets
of antecedents are tried. If a new explanation is overgeneral and explains some negative
examples, it can be specialized in a variety of ways, including adding terms or making
variables into constants to discriminate positive from negative examples. An explanation
is ranked according to how many positive and negative examples it explains and the number
of operational and nonoperational predicates it contains.
If, at any time, one of the frontier^^ explanations explains only positive examples, then
it is marked as consistent^® and is no longer expanded. When enough of these consistent
explanations have been found to cover all of the given positive examples and none of the
remaining frontier explanations look promising, then ML-SMART halts, having found a
complete and correct definition of the nonoperational predicate to be learned.
Critique
The system is described in too little detail to be readily critiqued. Search control is so
poorly explained that their example in the cups domain appears contrived. Other issues
that should have been explored include testing the effects of different domain theories
(complete and correct, only incomplete, only incorrect, etc.) on the size of the search tree,
and using domain theories where multiple explanations can be correct but not necessarily
inconsistent. Also, the system is nonincremental in that every training example must be
provided and classified before ML-SMART will begin, unlike Widmer's system that can
incrementally complete a domain theory.
^^ML-SMART is a best-first search algorithm. Therefore, an ordered frontier of unexpanded nodes is
maintained.
^®This means consistent with the examples, not the domain theory.
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5.2.3 SaranWrap
Overview
Pazzani and Kibler [Pazzani 90] introduce SaranWrap, an extension to Quinlan's in
ductive FOIL program [Quinlan, in press]. FOIL constructs a domain theory for a given
set of positive and negative instances by creating clauses that explain all of the positive
examples but none of the negative ones. These clauses are produced by starting with
the trivial clause irue and specializing it to cover only a subset of the positive examples.
Specialization of the clause is performed by adding variabilized predicates that maximize
information gain. The disjunction of all of the clauses forms a domain theory that explains
all of and only the positive examples (i.e., the theory is complete and correct and therefore
consistent).
Saranwrap extends FOIL in two ways, both of which involve limiting its search during
the extension of a clause. The first extension uses semantic constraints, such as type
constraints and multiple-argument constraints (all of the variables in a predicate must
differ). The second extension gives FOIL the ability to exploit partial domain theories,
with both operational and nonoperational predicates and with nonoperational concept
definitions. SaranWrap uses information gain to determine whether to accept, specialize,
or delete predicates in the supplied clauses. The information gain metric also guides the
operationalization of predicates.
Critique
It is interesting to note that, given a complete and correct domain theory, SaranWrap
will simply accept each clause verbatim. It will not attempt to "fix" a domain theory that
is not broken^®. But given no domain theory at all, SaranWrap will perform a hill-climbing
inductive search, guided by its information gain metric. Thus, SaranWrap resembles OC
CAM in that it too prefers EBL over SBL, but can operate without a perfect (or even
partial) domain theory if it must.
SaranWrap is very much like ML-SMART. Both systems are given a set of positive and
negative examples, and search for a set of clauses (or explanations, if you will) that cover
all of the positive examples and none of the negative ones. Of the two systems, SaranWrap
appears to have a better search control and is explained more clearly than ML-SMART. On
the other hand, ML-SMART uses best-first search rather than hill-climbing. Theoretically
it can find better sets to cover the positive examples than SaranWrap, at the expense of
more memory devoted to the search operation in the form of a search tree.
An incremental SaranWrap would be an interesting system. This would require a
substantial change in SaranWrap's current algorithm, including its information gain metric.
^®Unlike lOU, for instance.
33
However, such tightly integrated incremental systems are possible, as we saw in Widmer's
system.
5.3 Summary
A classification by domain assumptions of the twelve integrated systems is shown in Fig
ure 4 below. Nine systems make the single-explanation assumption, and six of these nine
systems assume the domain is incomplete. Interestingly, all of the incremental learners (see
Table 3) assume the domain theory is incomplete, and of the seven systems that assume
incomplete theories (the six single-explanations systems and PLAUSEX), five systems are
incremental.
Of the twelve systems, ten use a deductive-inductive combination, and eight of these
use deduction before induction, a marked preference to use EBL before SBL. The largest
group of these systems are nonincremental deductive-inductive learners that assume their
domain theory is incomplete and that it supports only a single explanation for a given
example.
RX
GEMINI
MIRO
Incomplete
CIGOL
OCCAM
Widmar's
Incorrect
Single
Incorrect
and
Inconsistent
Multiple
UNIMEM PLAUSEX
Incomplete,
Incomplete
/ Inconsistent
ML-SMART
SaranWrap
Figure 4: The surveyed systems classified by domain assumptions
Only two of the systems, PLAUSEX and CIGOL, use abduction, and both combine
it with inductive inference. Both have unique capabilities that come directly from their
abductive components. PLAUSEX can generate partial explanations that allow it to use
certain incomplete domain theories that some of the other deductive systems can not.
CIGOL can invent new predicates as hypotheses of what may explain its examples, and
can therefore extend its representation language. The success of these two systems implies
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a usefulness of abduction that awaits exploitation when combined with the other inference
methods.
The majority of these systems use one technique, usually EBL, followed by another,
usually SBL, in distinct phases. Four systems (marked with a f in Table 3) use a tightly
integrated approach in which both kinds of inference may be used at each step in the
algorithm. While the tightly integrated deductive-inductive learners have a preference
for deduction, two of these systems, ML-SMART and SaranWrap, can use any kind of
imperfect domain theory, even empty theories where deduction is useless.
These two systems also highlight the problem of trying to perfect incomplete domain
theories without also tolerating incorrect theories. Some of the systems, such as PLAUSEX
and OCCAM, transform incomplete theories into incorrect ones, that they are then unable
to fix. Other systems, such as lOE and lOU, cannot tolerate all incorrect theories, only
a proper subset. Both of these problems stem from the use of an SBL component, with
the former systems using the component to generalize theories and the latter performing
specialization. In other words, the low security of induction can lead to poorly developed
theories no matter what the condition of the original domain theory. At present, complete
supervision, as found in ML-SMART and SaranWrap, is the only solution to this problem
in integrated learning systems.
Flann and Dietterich comment in [Flann 89] that incorrect domain theories are easier to
create than incomplete theories. Essentially, it is simpler to produce an overgeneral theory
that may cover some negative examples than an overspecific theory that covers absolutely
no negative ones. Unfortunately, the majority of the integrated learning systems here are
designed for incomplete theories rather than incorrect ones.
Finally, none of the systems use all three inference methods as defined here. RX would
be the easiest system in which to add a third inference technique, but the addition of an
abductive component would change the nature of the systemfrom a knowledge acquisition
program to a diagnostic performance system. The other systems would be more difficult,
but the successful pairwise combinations of the inference methods suggest that a triply
integrated system could be quite powerful. Such a system, ifclassified like the others, might
appear as in Table 4. The DUCTOR would consist of a tight integration of abduction,
deduction, and induction and be capable of using and correcting any kind of imperfect
domain theory.
Main author System Combines
Supervised/
Incremental Domain assumptions
Cain DUCTOR A-D-If Unsuper/Increm Incom, Incor, Incon, Mult
Table 4: A hypothetical system
The DUCTOR will be incremental and unsupervised. These topics have not been discussed
in depth in this paper, mainly because advantageous combination of learning strategies
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appears to be the main direction of integrated learners at this time. GEMINI, PLAUSEX,
CIGOL, OCCAM, and Widmer's system are the incremental systems surveyed here, while
RX, GEMINI, UNIMEM,.and OCCAM are all unsupervised programs. The advantages of
incremental and unsupervised learning are numerous, but the effects caused by different
cornbinations of inference methods in these systems are more interesting.
Until recently, no integrated learners have been compared, either formally or empiri
cally, because they appeared to be solving different problems. With the framework provided
here, integrated learning systems can be classified by inference method and domain theory
assumptions, and similar systems can be compared theoretically and by their performance
on learning tasks.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a framework for integrated learning based on the three basic forms
of inference - deduction, induction, and abduction. A dozen integrated learning systems
were examined and critiqued with this framework in mind, and a summary of the systems
was provided based on their similarities and differences. Finally, the suggestion for a triply
integrated system was made in the hopes that several past successes with doubly integrated
learning have paved the way for more complex and more powerful integrated learners.
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firm this explanation, then a new explanatory generalization is created. If
they deny the explanation, then it is discarded. If the prior causal theories
neither confirm nor deny the explanation, then it is marked as a tentative
generalization. If a future event contradicts the tentative generalization,
it will be discarded. Otherwise, a variety of strategies can be employed
to confirm the tentative generalization, including increasing confidence as
it successfully predicts new events until some confirmatory threshold is
reached.
Pazzani, Michael. "Integrated Learning with Incorrect and Incom
plete Theories." In Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop
on Machine Learning, pp. 291-297. Ann Arbor: Morgan Kaufmann,
Inc., 1988.
This paper describes two extensions to OCCAM since its description
in [Pazzani 86]. The first extension allows OCCAM to work with incorrect
domain theories by revising its explanatory generalizations, or schemas,
when those schemas produce incorrect predictions. The second extension
allows OCCAM to work with incomplete domain theories by using an
empirical learning approach that can create the missing explanatory link
after seeing several examples.
Pazzani, Michael. "Detecting and Correcting Errors of Omission Af
ter Explanation-based Learning." In Proceedings of the Eleventh In
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 713-718.
Detroit: Morgan Kaufmann, Inc., 1989.
This paper describes an extension to OCCAM that can detect errors
caused by an overspecific (i.e., incomplete) domain theory. OCCAM can
determine the rule or rules at fault and revise them to account for the new
example. This extension diflfers from the ones presented in [Pazzani 88] by
its focus on performance examples rather than examples used to acquire
background knowledge. Experimental results show that OCCAM with
the extension can significantly improve its performance when using an
incomplete domain theory.
Pazzani, Michael and Kibler, Dennis. "The Utility of Knowledge in
Inductive Learning." Unpublished manuscript, 1990.
This paper presents SaranWrap, an extension to Quinlan's FOIL pro
gram [Quinlan, in press]. FOIL inductively builds a domain theory given
a set of positive and negative examples of a concept. SaranWrap improves
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foil's performance by limiting the search it performs to find the clauses
of this new domain theory. The extensions can be classed as incorporat
ing semantic constraints and giving FOIL the ability to use partial (and
possibly incorrect) domain theory knowledge.
Pazzani, Michael. "A Computational Theory of Learning Causal Re
lationships." In Cognitive Science Journal.
This paper introduces a theory of learning called theory-driven learn
ing (TDL), which produces a theory of causation from a set of observa
tions and theory of causality. The paper distinguishes between theories of
causation and theories of causality. A theory of causation predicts state
changes using a set of specific causal relationships between actions and
states. A theory of causality specifies how to learn the causal relation
ships themselves. For example, if an action on an object is followed by a
state change in the object, causality theory suggests that the action re
sulted in the state change. Causality theory aids the learner by focusing
attention on important actions (i.e., ones that have effects). An subject
experiment indicated that humans learn faster if the relationship to be
learned is consistent with their theory of causality. TDL is more limited
than similarity-based learning in terms of what it can learn, but TDL
learns faster. EBL is faster and more accurate than TDL, but only if it
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This is one of the earliest papers on the use of abduction as an automated
inferencing method for learning. Pople describes abduction in syllogistic
terms, comparing it to the other two fundamental inference methods,
deduction and induction. He then explains how a deductive linear reso
lution procedure can be used as an abductive procedure with only mi
nor changes, mainly by retaining certain literals abandoned by deduction
and producing alternate explanation structures. Pople provides the classic
liver example to illustrate his combined deductive/abductive algorithm.
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Tenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp.
205-207. Milan, Italy: Morgan Kaufman, 1987.
This paper introduces a finer classification scheme for imperfect theories
than the one presented in [MKK-C 86]. Two divisions of incompleteness
and inconsistency are provided. Incompleteness type 1 occurs when a
deductive proof cannot be completed because knowledge is missing. In
completeness type 2 occurs when the knowledge is too general and may
lead to invalid proofs or no proofs at all. Inconsistency type 1 occurs when
the theory contains the wrong knowledge, and inconsistency type 2 occurs
when the theory is missing knowledge that would prevent an invalid proof
from being derived. Methods of detecting and handling these imperfect
theories are discussed.
Russell, Stuart J., "Preliminary Steps Toward the Automation of
Induction." In Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Ar
tificial Intelligence, pp. 477-484. Philadelphia: Morgan Kaufmann,
Inc., 1986.
Russell proposes a theory of induction that bases the plausibility of an
inductively-produced rule on the amount of direct and indirect evidence
that is associated with it. Direct evidence is the usual set of positive and
negative instances that the rule correctly classifies. The indirect evidence
comes from a set of higher-level regularities, of which this rule is an in
stance. Regularities, in turn, are based on their own direct and indirect
evidence, i.e. its own set of instances and even higher-level regularities.
For example, say you meet several Americans who speak English. This
would lead you to suspect that all Americans speak English because of
the set of direct evidence and the regularity that people of a particular
country speak the same language. Russell presents several classes of reg
ularity already identified and compares his theory of induction to Nelson
Goodman's theory of projectibility.
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Integrating Empirical and Explanation-based Learning." In Proceed
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26-28. Ithaca, NY: Morgan Kaufmann, Inc, 1989.
This paper describes a combination of SBL and EBL using one-sided
algorithms, which never generate a hypothesis that is more general than
the target hypothesis. The method of combination, lOSC, is to update
the working hypothesis whenever a positive example is misclassified as
negative. If EBL can explain the example as positive, then the hypothesis
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has those features removed that appear in the example but not in the
explanation. Otherwise, SBL removes features from the hypothesis that
are not in the example. lOSC has been extended to handle k-CNF.
Thagard, Paul. "Explanatory Coherence." Unpublished manuscript,
1988.
This paper presents a theory of explanatory coherence to be used in the
ranking of scientific hypotheses and provides an implementation of the
theory in a connectionist program called ECHO. This theory consists of
seven principles that relate the hypothesis to other propositions (e.g.,
supporting data, contradictory evidence, etc.). The accepted hypothe
sis is the one which is more coherent than its competitors. Examples
of ECHO'S application is provided in the domains of chemistry, biology,
and law. Thagard also details the implications of his theory for artificial
intelligence, psychology, and philosophy.
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Learning." In Proceedings of the Sixth International Workshop on
Machine Learning, pp. 11-13. Ithaca, NY: Morgan Kaufmann, Inc,
1989.
Widmer presents an incremental, supervised learning system that tightly
integrates empirical and explanation-based learning. By "tight", Widmer
explains that both deduction and induction are used at various times dur
ing constructionofan explanation, rather than one component performing
all of its work and then transferring its results to the other component,
which finishes the work. Widmer identifies three types on links explaining
a feature F in the explanation tree. The first is the standard deductive link
connecting F with a set of conditions Cond from a rule F : - Cond. The
second is determination-based analogy, where F is explained by reference
to another situation having the same combination of features, including
F. The third type of link explains F by finding a similarity between the
present situation and another situation that includes F; either certain
features of the situation indicate that it belongs to a certain class, or a
particular rule almost fits the current situation and can be generalized
to fit. The latter leads to incremental generalization, while the former is
inductive generalization.
Wilkins, David. "Knowledge Base Refinement Using Apprenticeship
Learning Techniques." In Proceedings of the Seventh National Con-
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Kaufmann, Inc., 1988.
This paper describes the semi-automatic correction of knowledge bases
through the use of a human expert. The system observes the expert solv
ing a problem (diagnosis is used as an example) and tries to explain every
action the human performs. If the system cannot explain an action, then
it attempts to learn the knowledge required to complete its explanation.
A test showed that the system improved its performance by 42% after
observing two diagnostic sessions.
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This paper attempts to explore the dichotomies between empirical data
versus reasoning and analysis versus synthesis. Wollowski also highlights
the difference between empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge. He
gives a weak argument for why deduction and induction would not form
a powerful integrated learning system. Finally, he concludes with an ex
ample of why analysis and synthesis is not necessarily always performed
by deduction and induction respectively.
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